The long-term effects of mass incarceration on Japanese families

Figure 4 reports results from a linear model regressing indicators of political engagement on measures of direct exposure and family‐only exposure to incarceration with fixed effects for preevacuation residential locations and generational identifiers. We also control for age and gender. (The full specification is provided in app. C.) The figure shows that those who were incarcerated are about 13% of a scale point (±9% of a scale point)¹¹ less likely to report an interest in American politics than those who were not, a statistically significant difference.

These patterns are similar among Japanese Americans who themselves were not incarcerated but who had family that were. These individuals are about 18% of a scale point (±9% of a scale point) less likely to express interest in politics. These estimates correspond to a movement of approximately 3% and 4% along a three‐point scale, respectively. For both distrust and political advice, estimates are in the expected direction, but there is considerable uncertainty.

Additionally, those who had direct exposure to incarceration are about 11% of a scale point (±11% of a scale point) more likely to support a “peaceful and orderly” leadership approach during detainment than one employing protest and dissent, relative to others. Among those who were not incarcerated themselves but had family who were, this difference is approximately 19% of a scale point (±11% of a scale point). These two estimates reflect a 3% and 6% movement across a three‐point scale, respectively.

Consistent with intergenerational transmission, coefficient estimates for both detainment status measures are strikingly similar across outcomes. Formal tests of differences between the two never reach conventional levels of statistical significance (table 7).

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We would suspect, in accordance with the literature on ethnic targeting (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017) and carceral contact in the United States (Weaver and Lerman 2010), that longer interments would more strongly demobilize and depress civic engagement. After all, shorter detainments may have little effect, but longer detainments may expose prisoners to more intragroup conflict, perhaps souring them on future engagement (Weaver and Lerman 2010).

To analyze this, we subset the data to only those with direct experience with incarceration. We again control for age, gender, and generational cohort. Those incarcerated for longer periods had greater attenuation in political engagement, shown in figure 5. (The full specification is provided in app. sec. C.2.)

An additional year of being incarcerated is associated with approximately 1.4% of a scale point decrease in political interest (±2.6% of a scale point, so narrowly insignificant), a 4.2 percentage point increase in distrust (±2.2 percentage points), a 3.4 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of being sought out for political advice (±1.6 percentage points), and 4.3% of a scale point (±3.4% of a scale point) increase in supporting a peaceful and orderly leadership approach during the detainment process.

To put this into context, those who were incarcerated for four years or more (6% of the incarcerated sample) are approximately 4% of a scale point less likely to report an interest in American politics than those who were incarcerated for less than one year (12% of the incarcerated subsample).

Moreover, they are approximately 17 percentage points more likely to express distrust in government, 14 percentage points less likely to be sought out for political advice, and 17% of a scale point more likely to support a peaceful and orderly leadership strategy. This corresponds to a movement of about 6% across the three‐point scale.